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Abstract
Background: Kenya experienced rapid scale up of HIV testing and counselling services in government health
services from 2001. We set out to examine the human resource policy implications of scaling up HIV testing and
counselling in Kenya and to analyse the resultant policy against a recognised theoretical framework of health
policy reform (policy analysis triangle).
Methods: Qualitative methods were used to gain in-depth insights from policy makers who shaped scale up. This
included 22 in-depth interviews with Voluntary Counselling and Testing (VCT) task force members, critical analysis
of 53 sets of minutes and diary notes. We explore points of consensus and conflict amongst policymakers in Kenya
and analyse this content to assess who favoured and resisted new policies, how scale up was achieved and the
importance of the local context in which scale up occurred.
Results: The scale up of VCT in Kenya had a number of human resource policy implications resulting from the
introduction of lay counsellors and their authorisation to conduct rapid HIV testing using newly introduced rapid
testing technologies. Our findings indicate that three key groups of actors were critical: laboratory professionals,
counselling associations and the Ministry of Health. Strategic alliances between donors, NGOs and these three key
groups underpinned the process. The process of reaching consensus required compromise and time commitment
but was critical to a unified nationwide approach. Policies around quality assurance were integral in ensuring
standardisation of content and approach.
Conclusion: The introduction and scale up of new health service initiatives such as HIV voluntary counselling and
testing necessitates changes to existing health systems and modification of entrenched interests around
professional counselling and laboratory testing. Our methodological approach enabled exploration of complexities
of scale up of HIV testing and counselling in Kenya. We argue that a better understanding of the diverse actors,
the context and the process, is required to mitigate risks and maximise impact.
Background
The expansion of voluntary counselling and testing for
H I V( V C T )h a si m p l i c a t i o n sf o rh u m a nr e s o u r c e s .
There has been increasing global recognition of the
need for task shifting (whereby medical tasks are dele-
gated to less specialised health care workers) in response
to the HIV epidemic [1,2]. 2008 saw the launch of new
task shifting guidelines [3] with a number of countries
reporting the success of this approach in HIV services
generally [4,5] and in HIV counselling and testing speci-
fically [6,7]. However, as new cadres of staff emerge,
concerns remain over the professional recognition of lay
staff, their training and supervisory support as well as
quality assurance mechanisms [8,9]. * Correspondence: M.Taegtmeyer@liverpool.ac.uk
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chronically under-resourced health care system and a
high prevalence of poverty [10]. In the public sector in
2004, there were 3 doctors and 49 nurses per 100 000
population and more than half of all health personnel
were based in urban areas [11]. The average health cen-
tre has no laboratory staff and a district hospital having
an average of only 4 technicians and technologists.
Kenya continues to lose large numbers of qualified
health care workers, including high numbers of labora-
tory staff every year [12]. On the one hand the Govern-
ment of Kenya is committed to scale up of access to
HIV services, on the other hand donors are unwilling to
fund salaries and a recent International Monetary Fund
moratorium on hiring of civil servants means that
despite increasing workloads, the government is not able
to hire additional health professionals [13,14].
In 2000, when this work commenced, an estimated 2.2
million adult Kenyans were infected with HIV [15]. Pre-
valence rates showed significant regional and rural/
urban variations, average urban prevalence was (10%)
nearly twice that in rural areas (5-6%) and some districts
in Nyanza province had prevalence rates in excess of
30% [16]. Kenya is an example of a country where task
shifting has been employed to facilitate the rapid scale
up of client-initiated counselling and testing services in
government health facilities [17,18] and high prevalence
areas were targeted in the initial phase of scale up. The
introduction in 2000 of rapid HIV testing technology
that enabled whole blood from a finger prick to be used
for testing made it possible for lay counsellors to con-
duct HIV testing with rapid and reliable results [19].
Kenya then saw a rapid increase in the availability of
VCT from 3 sites in 2000 to over 400 registered sites in
early 2004 [17].
The Kenyan scenario represents the kind of challenges
that health policymakers are faced with in many
resource poor countries: the need to increase the flex-
ibility of health services provision balanced with the
need for quality and professionalism. New HIV services
are provided in a fast-changing context with wide reach-
ing implications for human resources. Kenya has a
chronically under-resourced health care system [20].
Staffing implications need to be understood in the con-
text of serious shortages, mal-distribution of staff and
financing constraints [1]. We set out to explore the
complex interactions between the key actors, the con-
text they operated in and the processes that evolved as
human resources policies for the scale up of HIV testing
and counselling (HTC) were developed.
Methods
Qualitative research methodologies were employed,
appropriate to exploring policymakers’ perceptions and
attitudes of human resources for VCT scale up [21,22].
Methods which were carried out simultaneously
included participant observation, review of minutes of
taskforce meetings and individual in-depth interviews
with key informants all conducted by the principal
investigator (MT). Scale-up occurred across the country
and so the whole of Kenya may therefore be seen as the
study area. With the exception of a one week retreat in
2001, all taskforce meetings were held in Nairobi and
this is where the policymaker interviews were
conducted.
A total of 53 sets of minutes, representing all of the
taskforce meetings held between Sept 2000 and July
2004 were reviewed. Close to 80% (42/53) of these had
matching diary notes. Consideration was given to the
interaction of the individuals as well as the group pro-
cesses and decisions in analysis of diary notes. MT was
thus both a participant and an observer [23], and ‘insi-
ders’ (co-authors who were members of the VCT task-
f o r c e-A I ,J H N ,C N ,J S )a sw e l la s‘outsiders’ were
included in the qualitative analysis process. While the
authors’ involvement in the process may have led to
subjectivity, the close ‘insider’ involvement allowed
unique insights, grounded in a reflexive approach.
Awareness of the difficulties, dilemmas and potential
biases of the methodology meant that steps were taken
to mitigate them. Open-ended questions followed by
probes were used in interviews to enable participants’
own views to be clearly expressed. The roles of indivi-
duals within the group are examined reflexively in the
analytical process to assess their influence on policy and
in shaping strategies for VCT scale up.
Purposive sampling was employed to recruit intervie-
wees with rich and relevant experience [24]. Intervie-
wees ranged from those with first hand experiences
establishing VCT programmes, to technical advisors,
donors and Ministry of Health (MoH) officials. Not all
were permanent members of the taskforce but all were
key political drivers of the scale up process. A total of
22 interviews were conducted, 14 of whom were task-
force members. Interviews were conducted in English by
MT between March and May 2004 and were audio-
taped with concomitant note-taking. Informed consent
was obtained and participants’ details were anonymised
and coded. However, the gender and position of partici-
pants means that many would be able to recognise not
only their own inputs but also those of fellow members
of the VCT taskforce. Wherever possible (given the time
delay) results were sent to participants for feedback and
‘participant checking’, thus ensuring quality control.
Feedback was received from 15 of 22 interviewees (some
were no longer contactable), who indicated they were
happy with the way their views were identified and por-
trayed. For these participants, details of gender and
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others these details are not included to maintain
confidentiality.
All 22 interviews were included in the analysis. Data
analysis commenced during the data collection period
allowing emerging issues to be included in subsequent
interviews and issues from participant observation to be
included in the interview guide. Once complete, the
data were analysed using a thematic framework [25],
integrating themes from interviews with those from par-
ticipant observations and diary notes enabling cross con-
nections to be made. Our analysis was informed by
conceptual and empirical work by Walt and Gilson
[26,27] and Buse [28], who developed a simplified analy-
tical model, called the ‘health policy triangle’ (see Figure
1). The model was developed to address the problem
that the focus of most policy analysis at the time - in
this case related to health reform - was on the content
of the policy. Like Reich [29] they believed that policy
change is a highly political process and therefore actors
were at the centre of the process. In addition, attention
should be paid to the processes of developing policy
including how the policy issue arises (agenda setting),
how decisions are made in the development and finally
how the policy is implemented. Finally, all this takes
place with a particular context (for example, the particu-
l a rr o l eo ft h es t a t e ,w i t h i nas p e c i f i cc u l t u r e sa n dt h e
current economic situation), which along with the policy
content formed the three apices of the triangle around
the actors. This model, or variants of it, continues to be
used in resource poor contexts for analysis of health
policy [30-32]. In our analysis, too, particular attention
was paid to the complex inter-relationships between the
actors (forming the centre of the triangle) and the con-
text, processes and content.
All study participants provided written informed con-
s e n ta n dw e r ei n f o r m e do ft h es t u d yb yt h eV C Tt a s k -
force at the Kenyan National AIDS and STD Control
Programme, which gave explicit permission for meeting
minutes to be reviewed. Ethical approval was obtained
from the Kenya Medical Research Institute for opera-
tional research on the scale up of VCT. This specific
study also received institutional approval from the Liver-
pool School of Tropical Medicine Research Ethics Com-
mittee (ref 03.62).
Results
Data was synthesized from all the different qualitative
methods employed, the results shed light on the difficul-
ties faced in instigating task shifting policy. The health
policy triangle (see Figure 1) is used to graphically illus-
trate and structure the findings. The findings are thus
presented against the four areas in the triangle: ‘context’,
‘actors’, ‘process’ and ‘content’.
Context of VCT scale up in Kenya
In late 2000 a consultative meeting [19] on VCT set the
agenda for scale up, outlined government strategy and
reviewed the results of pilot studies conducted in Kenya
[33] as well as experience with rapid testing from else-
where. Key to the discussion was the availability of new
rapid testing technologies. These were easy to conduct
by lay people, meaning that specialised laboratory train-
ing was not necessary, did not require electricity or
external reagents and gave results in 15 minutes, thus
enabling the giving of results immediately after testing.
In 2001 a national taskforce convened to oversee VCT
services in Kenya. From the outset it intended to
actively promote task shifting such that the burden of
extra work created by HIV counselling and testing was
distributed throughout the different categories of staff
and maximum benefit was gained from the use of lay
counsellors. With this in mind a new combined role,
designated ‘VCT counsellor’, was conceived and a uni-
fied curriculum for training was published by the
National AIDS and STD Control Programme (NAS-
COP). This covered counselling skills, rapid HIV testing
using whole blood and quality assurance [34]. It was
open to health care professionals as well as lay
counsellors.
Over 2500 VCT counsellors were trained and certified
and 900 new sites opened in the following six years.
The majority (80%) of these VCT sites were located in
Figure 1 Policy analysis of VCT scale up (adapted from Walt
and Gilson 1994).
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ing in clinical settings was increasing in Kenya with
antenatal clinics and hospitals incorporating provider-
initiated HIV testing and counselling (PITC) as a rou-
tine standard of care. Health facilities trying to find
ways to provide HIV counselling and testing in addition
to their existing clinical services were experiencing sig-
nificant new human resource challenges.
Key actors and their interests in task shifting
Table 1 contains a summary of the key actors and their
interests in task shifting. The strategic alliance between
donors (who did not support salaries for government
staff) and the central Ministry of Health (who were not
in a position to hire new staff) was instrumental in
encouraging task shifting.
“We have had a non-replacement policy within the
hospitals and within most of the MoH now for years.
At this point it is impossible for a major redirection
of health personnel into VCT.” (Male donor, key
informant interview.)
The VCT taskforce was established with donor fund-
ing for initial meetings under MoH leadership in late
2000 and was convened by NASCOP. While the back-
bone of membership was MoH officials, donors and
their implementing partners, a number of technical
Table 1 Key actors and their potential impact on task shifting policy
Actor Engagement with taskforce Interest regarding scale up and
task shifting policy
Potential
support for
lay counsellor
testing*
Evidence of support or
opposition to task shifting
Ministry of
Health (central)
Limited but aware Use existing salary lines: encourage
task shifting
+++ Agrees to meetings with all
players
Ministry of
Health (NACC)
Limited but aware No significant engagement.
Supportive if CBOs and NGOs using
lay counsellors
+ National AIDS Strategy sets targets
for scale up
No significant involvement in the
processes
Ministry of
Health
(NASCOP)
Convened taskforce in 2001
Host meetings
Open as many sites as possible with
wide geographic coverage
++ Provides enabling policy
environment
Open wording to appease all
players
Accepts variety of financial
contributions
Ministry of
Health
(provincial and
district level)
Occasionally invited to meetings Ensure quality of sites in districts
Pragmatic: work within existing
resources
Maintain good relationships and a
motivated workforce
++++ Provides services and input
practical advice into policy
development
Seeks additional donor support
Laboratory
associations
Individuals attend meetings on behalf
of other actors (e.g. if working for a
donor but also an association
member).
Not formally engaged in taskforce
until 2003
Maintain quality of tests
Maintain professionalism in testing
Create jobs for unemployed
laboratory technicians and
technologists
- Engages senior Ministry of Health
officials and at times national
newspapers to try to prevent task
shifting
Counselling
associations
Only one (of two possible)
counselling associations engaged in
taskforce
Recognition for counselling as a
profession
Maintain quality of counselling
Maintain a monopoly on recognised
training institutions
Continue current curricula on
theories of counselling
+ Disagree with length and focus of
training curriculum
Approach central Ministry of
Health directly to request
counselling recognised as a cadre
in the Ministry
Donors and
their
implementing
partners
Provided driving force for taskforce
establishment, including funds for
secretariat
No funding for government salaries:
encourage task shifting but varying
approaches to incentives for lay
counsellors
Report high client flow
Report high numbers of sites opened
+++ Funding to government directly
to convene taskforce, collect data
etc.
Influence through support to
implementing partners whose
remit is policy change
Influence through support to
NGO/CBOs
*+indicates support of lay counsellor testing and - indicates lack of support
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ence in HIV testing and other key stakeholders were
i n v i t e dt oa t t e n de i t h e rf r o mt h eo n s e to ra tv a r i o u s
stages over the course of the next few years (seen in the
first column of table 1). The inclusion of individuals
with experience at the district level allowed human
resource lessons, pilot studies and operational research
to shape policy development.
Professional associations were also influential, but had
a potential to undermine moves towards task shifting.
Traditionally, both laboratory and counselling associa-
tions have been involved in HIV testing and counselling.
Both expressed concerns that scale up and task shifting
might compromise quality. The two associations looked
at quality from two different angles. Whereas the coun-
selling association did not mind lay counsellors conduct-
ing the testing, they were concerned over the length and
content of the counselling training. On the other hand,
the laboratory association were less concerned with this
and more opposed to lay counsellors conducting testing.
Laboratory operations are regulated by the Kenya Medi-
cal Laboratory Technicians and Technologists Board
under an Act of Parliament and personnel may join the
Association of Kenya Medical Laboratory Scientific Offi-
cers [35] that acted as advocates for its members, rather
like a union [36]. Initial taskforce meetings agreeing the
VCT guidelines included a number of laboratory profes-
sionals who were members, but not official representa-
tives, of the board and association. Like many cadres of
health professionals in Kenya there are a significant
number of unemployed laboratory staff, as well as an
employment embargo, which according to some was
imposed by the International Monetary Fund [37,38].
The association did not see the use of task shifting as
being in the best interests of it members, the majority of
whom saw HIV testing as the prerogative of laboratory
technicians and technologists. They referred to the VCT
guidelines, which state that they should conduct testing
where available, to reinforce their arguments.
“it rightly belongs to the lab people to test.” (Labora-
tory technologist, key informant interview.)
The government does not currently recognize the
counselling profession as a cadre in the MoH. As well
as theory-based university courses in counselling psy-
chology there are many registered counselling organisa-
tions. Two large associations of professional counsellors
undertake generic training to certificate, higher diploma
and Master’s level. These organisations saw HIV testing
as an opportunity to promote counselling as a profes-
sion. They underscored its central role in HIV services
and encouraged members to learn how to conduct rapid
testing. Once happy with the move to rename the new
trainees as ‘VCT counsellors’ as distinct from ‘profes-
sional counsellors’ the associations shared training curri-
cula with the national committee, took part in the
process of developing a unified curriculum and encour-
aged as many as possible to attend their own or other
recognised VCT counsellor training courses, whilst try-
ing to maintain prime position in this market.
A number of large international non-governmental
organisations and smaller local organizations, funded by
donors, were involved in the provision of VCT services
or technical support including procurement, logistics,
counselling and testing and social marketing. Some were
tasked by their donors to work with government staff,
whilst others provided independent services. Donor poli-
cies generally restricted direct salary support to govern-
ment staff but organisations were able to give technical
and quality support. A number of the smaller organisa-
tions established mechanisms for donor funds to be rou-
ted through NGOs most of whom also had a vested
interest in sustaining their own funds. The relationship
between donors as taskforce drivers who promoted the
scale up of lay counsellors and concerns around sustain-
ability were openly debated in Kenya, where donors had
high expectations of the speed of scale up and pushed
the lay counsellor agenda from early on without formal
assessment of longer-term sustainability (see table 1).
Processes in task shifting
The process of reaching consensus on task shifting suffi-
cient for the publication of unified national guidelines
and curriculum involved lengthy discussions. The task-
force took a number of pragmatic early decisions based
on the results of a pilot study [39]. They were: to use
health professionals selected from all cadres already on
the government pay roll, to come up with a uniform
training curriculum and to allow non-laboratory staff to
conduct testing.
The development of the training manual for VCT
counsellors was a contentious issue in the VCT task-
force and between counselling organisations, the MoH,
international agencies and technical advisors (subcom-
mittee minutes 2001). The development of the manual
to the satisfaction of all parties with different views took
almost two years to complete. There was disagreement
on the length of training, counselling organizations
wanted longer training, government agreed to a two-
week training and some technical and donor agencies
pushed for two-day training on testing alone. The last
two groups were concerned that time away from service
provision for training would exacerbate existing
shortages. There was also disagreement on the content
of counselling. The professional counsellors were push-
ing for a training that was grounded in counselling the-
ories leaving them able to conduct fully client-centred
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was still client-centred but focused on exploring indivi-
dual HIV risk issues and others still wanted a simplified
training that taught counselling through providing trai-
nees with lists of statements and questions on pre-
printed cards that were to be used to guide the sessions.
The disparate elements, content, curricula and theories
of adult education were brought together in a participa-
tory process and a manual was published in 2002.
Acrimonious debates in the taskforce (recurring theme
in taskforce minutes Nov 2000 - Sept 2003) dominated
the decisions on whether health workers (primarily
nurses) or counsellors should provide the counselling
and testing. Some committee members argued that it
was wrong to divert health workers from clinical duties;
others argued that medical diagnoses should remain the
prerogative of clinicians and HIV testing the prerogative
of laboratory technicians and technologists (diary notes,
March 7-9
th,2 0 0 1 ;G u i d e l i n e sR e t r e a t ) . There has been
an evolution over time in response to these concerns.
Initially health workers provided VCT services delivered
in health facilities, and lay or non-medical counsellors
provided services in stand-alone or community sites. By
2005 lay counsellors were employed to work as VCT
counsellors in health facilities but government funding
for these finished in 2009. By 2011, few remained in
place. Instead health workers provide HIV testing and
counselling as part of ‘provider-initiated testing and
counselling’ (PITC) in health facilities and lay counsel-
lors are employed in stand-alone VCT sites, mobile, out-
reach and door-to-door HIV testing and counselling
programmes. Senior laboratory staff who have been on a
training course train and certify VCT counsellors in
HIV rapid testing, supervise the VCT counsellors doing
testing and support the district medical laboratory in-
charges to provide quality assurance mechanisms in
VCT sites. In the end, the agreed wording for the guide-
lines was:
“All HIV testing for VCT should be done by labora-
tory technologists or technicians. However, in some
locations and settings this is not possible. If they have
successfully completed an accredited training in test-
ing procedures and are supervised by a laboratory
technologist/technician, other health workers may
perform simple rapid tests for VCT purposes.”
Practically however, only a proportion of testing was
conducted by laboratory personnel. A few large stand-
alone sites were able to hire one technician or technolo-
gist, but most sites, including health facilities, were con-
ducting in-room testing by health care workers
(participant observation, diary notes Nov 21st 2001).
Some time after VCT was well established in the
country, the issue was brought to the attention of the
central MoH who tried to placate both sides, changing
the wording of the guidelines to add ‘or any other per-
son authorised by the Minister of Health’.
“because the government has supported VCT scale up
knowing that we don’th a v ee n o u g hl a bp e o p l et o
cope.” (Female programme officer, Nairobi, KII.)
At the Annual Conference of Laboratory Scientific
Officers in Kakamega in October 2002, data from imple-
menting partners VCT sites were presented that con-
firmed that lay counsellors who conducted testing were
getting a 99.6% level of accuracy according to rigorous
external quality assurance [40]. Despite this and due in
part to a lack of clear statement from leadership, the
dispute continued to rage. Variously described in inter-
v i e w sa sa’turf war’ a ’threat to professionalism’ and ’a
concern over quality standards’, the deliberations over
who should conduct testing almost brought VCT scale
up to a halt and reached the press in August 2003 with
articles raising quality concerns about non-laboratory
personnel testing. Popular daily national papers includ-
ing the Nation, Standard and East African carried
almost daily articles on the debate with headings such
as ‘Sincerity Lacking in VCTs’, ‘The Big Issue: Panic
over HIV testing’; ‘Fix it now, VCT debate getting out
of control’ and ‘Government defends VCTs’ (Figure 2).
The debate was intended to air the concerns of the
Association about the professional erosion of the labora-
tory staff but actually gave a platform for donors to
sponsor articles explaining quality assurance procedures
and stimulated public interest in VCT sites.
Despite this the conflict was barely noticed outside
Nairobi. In fact some of the district and provincial inter-
viewees thought the bad publicity may have stimulated
Figure 2 Sample VCT newspaper headlines August and
September 2003.
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between the routine laboratory staff and VCT.
“At national level there has been a lot of politics but
in our area so far no problem.” (District Medical
Officer of Health, KII.)
The laboratory members interviewed would have wel-
comed their inclusion in planning, in study design to
evaluate quality, and in early stages of roll-out. The
omission of the official representatives of the profes-
sional association and senior laboratory personnel work-
ing with the government was felt to be an error.
H o w e v e r ,t h e r ew e r es t i l lt h o s ew h of e l tt h a ta ne a r l y
official lab presence may have inhibited scale up in the
public sector.
“If they were on the taskforce earlier it might have
affected scale up. Depending on how strong they were
or how forceful of their point of view it could have
blocked expansion.” (Female, donor, KII.)
Content of task shifting
The initial strategies for VCT scale up did not make
task shifting policies for VCT explicit. Assumptions
were made that health care workers, taken from a num-
ber of different cadres, would perform dual roles.
“VCT are manned from all directions. Some are pub-
lic health technicians, some are nurses etc.” (Male,
programme officer, KII.)
There was an awareness that similar HIV counselling
programmes had failed in the past due to the impact of
dual roles (doing counselling as well as nursing) on pro-
vider stress, high attrition rates and inconsistent service
delivery. This led to deliberate policies on the preven-
tion of counsellor burn out through a policy of manda-
tory attendance at support supervision sessions.
Furthermore lay personnel and ‘volunteer counsellors’
were encouraged to apply for training positions and to
provide services with NGO support. Despite efforts to
mitigate the impact of task shifting on strained
resources, concerns arose not only about the lack of
deliberate policy but also about the lack of clear line
management structures that ensued. Staff reported to -
and were evaluated by - their former bosses in their
main discipline, many of whom were not versed in the
expectations or job descriptions for VCT counsellors.
This created tensions. For example, counsellors were
told to see a max of 8-15 clients per day. A departmen-
tal head who had over 50 patients waiting to be served
in another department by one nurse/midwife could not
understand why someone would serve only 8 or 15 cli-
ents. Those who tried to perform both roles were fru-
strated and overworked. This resulted in internal
conflict or frustrated clients as VCT service opening
times became irregular in order to fit round other work
expectations.
Subsequently the lack of promotional structures and
of recognition for counselling as a cadre threatened the
task shifting policies as far as the use of other health
professionals was concerned and increasingly opened
the door for lay counsellors to provide services in health
facilities.
On the other hand, policies around quality assurance
were integral to the scale-up strategy in Kenya [18] and
were central in guiding how to task shift to lay counsel-
lors, many of whom were volunteers. The guidelines
and training curriculum became a key element of the
subsequent site registration and quality assurance sys-
tems. Within a year of the establishment of the task-
force, the guidelines had been disseminated throughout
Kenya and an enforced registration system meant that
all VCT sites should be operating under the same stan-
dards (Report on piloting of registration system VCT
taskforce minutes Nov 7th 2001). Only registered sites
could access the free HIV test kits funded by a World
Bank loan [41] in exchange for data on client uptake. A
national data form was developed and registered sites
completed a form for each individual.
“The government took a loan from the World Bank
for the purchase of test kits. It helped us. Free kits
probably accelerated the process and allowed us to
control it.” (Male MoH taskforce member, KII.)
The registration system then formed the basis of a
comprehensive quality assurance programme that
included supervision of counselling and testing, continu-
ing education, laboratory-based testing using dried
blood spots and inspection of sites. In late 2003 a
National Quality Assurance Team was established,
including laboratory supervisory staff, who visited all
sites annually. The team found high standards of testing
in registered sites [40] and reported high client confi-
dence in the approach used.
“It is important for the client and the counsellor to
do their thing together and for the client to watch.
T h e nc l i e n t sh a v ea b s o l u t ec o n f i d e n c ei nt h e i r
results.” (Male, laboratory, KII.)
Discussion
Our findings indicate that programmers have to deal
with more than the content (the technical components)
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qualitative approach has revealed multiple complex
layers as individuals and groups with their own personal
and political histories and interactions all play a role.
Our methodology and our policy analysis, that was not
restricted to the policy content, but included all four
components of the policy triangle, have enabled an in-
depth understanding of the human resource implica-
tions of VCT scale up from the perspective of the full
breadth of task force members, including representative,
experienced service providers. First we need to be clear
about the actors and their interests (which may or may
not be supportive). Next we need to understand the
context as this might influence the interests of the
actors (for example an employment embargo heighten-
ing the opposition of the lab staff to task-shifting).
Finally, with a better understanding of the actors and
the context and the potential risks involved, the content
and the process can be better planned. These findings
have resonance for the provision of new services, such
as new rapid diagnostic tests or new care pathways in
many settings.
Despite staffing shortages, medical training colleges in
many resource-poor countries continue to produce
health care workers, without significant overlapping
skills, who strive to maintain high standards. These
health care workers are understandably protective of
professional boundaries and this protectionism has the
potential to threaten or even deliberately sabotage the
move to task shifting. The advent of a new testing tech-
nology which could be performed without extensive
laboratory training clearly raised concerns among
laboratory workers Kenya. The VCT taskforce com-
pounded this by failing to engage adequately with all the
officially recognized groups (Board and Association) of
laboratory seniors. A better understanding of the pre-
ceding political conflicts between the Association and
the Board as well as of the positions and legitimate con-
cerns of the members would have allowed a smoother
path to scale up. Some members’ concerns may have
been rooted in their training. As a result, despite docu-
mented high standards of lay counsellors conducting
testing [40], the professional associations diverted time
and attention away from supervision and the establish-
ment of comprehensive quality assurance systems for
HIV testing in all settings (including provider-initiated
HIV testing and counselling) to do battle with VCT.
Time has shown that their concerns over quality of test-
ing are justified in the absence of comprehensive and
funded systems of training, certification, data recording
and external retesting of samples.
In keeping with findings from Zambia and Cameroon
we highlight the importance of clearly re-defining roles
and task-shifting procedures [6,42]. Our data also
indicated that the success of task shifting in Kenya was
in part due to the quality assurance systems for HIV
testing. While the introduction of task shifting for HIV
counselling and testing in Kenya has enabled rapid scale
up of services, it was the flexibility around who conducts
testing that allowed expansion into non-medical areas,
outreach services and non-government facilities. This
f l e x i b i l i t yw a sp o s s i b l et h r o u g ht h es c a l eu po fo n eu n i -
fied regulatory and quality assurance system [18]. Qual-
ity assurance systems for VCT scale up in Kenya are
thus both part of the context (as they were planned as
part of scale up from the outset) and the content as
policies evolved and new systems piloted as scale up
progressed.
In 2005 Kenyan unified guidelines broadened the
scope of HIV testing further to include all health cadres
with minimal training [43]. Here, even more so than in
VCT, rapid expansion has threatened the quality of ser-
vices, both in Kenya and globally [44,45]. External qual-
ity assurance systems for testing and counselling are not
maintained in provider-initiated HIV testing and coun-
selling to the same standard as those in VCT sites. Test-
ing sites do not conduct proficiency panels and do not
send dried blood spots from rapid tests to reference
laboratories (personal communication, NASCOP, 2008).
Indeed there is no national picture of where testing is
conducted, who is doing the testing and what the qual-
ity of ward and clinic-based testing is. It has also
become the expectation that every health care worker
will do counselling in every clinical setting. While this
has increased the rates of HIV testing and counselling,
it has also led to missed opportunities for prevention
messages and created a coercive atmosphere around
testing in some settings [44,46]. Involving lay counsel-
lors in busy clinics conducting HTC has been a success-
ful approach in Botswana [47] and may yet have a role
to play in PITC scale up with a renewed focus on uni-
versal access to HTC. Issues of sustainability, quality
assurance of testing and the use of lay counsellors are
still debated and local actors, processes and content are
vital components in understanding how these opportu-
nities can be maximised in different contexts.
Conclusion
Our findings are still relevant today as new approaches
to HTC are scaled up within health systems and staff
struggle to balance the human resources requirements
with the need to maintain quality of service and labora-
tory and counselling professionalism. Our analysis
shows that the use of lay counsellors and health care
workers from a number of cadres to conduct counsel-
ling as well as testing in Kenya served to strengthen
rather than undermine primary care without diverting
significant resources from laboratories or depleting any
Taegtmeyer et al. BMC Public Health 2011, 11:812
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Page 8 of 10one cadre. Concentrating only on the content or techni-
cal side of programme scale up is likely to fail, whatever
the approach to HTC scale up that is being used. A cri-
tical and informed analysis of context and actors and
the prioritisation of quality assurance are central to the
successful scale up of HIV services.
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